Even a cursory view of German literature since the late eighteenth century will notice a close affinity between the spheres of medicine and literature. German writers have not only produced a great number of texts dealing with the representation of illness and the changing social status of physicians. Many of them have also studied medicine and/ or lived a kind of double existence as homme de lettres and physician: Albrecht Haller, Johann Heinrich JungStilling, Friedrich Schiller in the eighteenth century; Justus Kerner, Carl-Gustav Cams, and Georg Buchner in the nineteenth century; and, to mention only the most well-known, Arthur Schnitzler, Hans Carossa, Ernst WeiB, and Gottfried Benn as representatives of literary modernism. One of the most prolific of these "writer-physicians" was the German-Jewish novelist Alfred Dublin (1878 Dublin ( -1957 While working on his best-known novel, Berlin Alexanderplatz, Dublin published a short autobiographical essay for Die literarische Welt, one of the leading cultural journals in the Weimar Republic.
"Arzt and Dichter" ("Physician and Writer") was his contribution to a series of articles for which prominent authors were asked to reflect on their nonliterary interests and occupations. After confessing that he would rather give up writing than his medical profession if the circumstances of life should force him to make a decision between the two, Dublin gives his readers a hint as to why he became a psychiatrist in pre-World War I Berlin:
When I was done with medical school, I was in my mid-twenties and nothing was as urgent to me as withdrawing myself from the so-called struggle for life. I went to several insane asylums as an assistant. I always felt good among these ill people. At this time I noticed that besides plants, animals, and stones I am able to tolerate only two categories of people: that is to say, children and lunatics. These I have always really loved. And if someone asks me to which nation I belong I shall say: neither to the Germans nor to the Jews, but to the children and lunatics. (Leben 92) Dublin's linking together of children and the mentally ill as two different kinds of "pre-conscious," "natural" beings is of course not very original. This association, to which the female psyche was often added, has accompanied the literary discourse of the insane since the late eighteenth century and was particularly popular in German Romanticism.' But in 1927 there existed a more personal rea-2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol22/iss1/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1436 son for Doblin's identification with the insane. As his statement indicates, identifying with the insane allows him to reject both "Germans" and "Jews." Against the background of rising anti-Semitism in the 1920s, both his identification with one group of "outsiders" (the insane) and his rebuff of another group of "outsiders" to which he belonged by birth (the Jews) can be read as Doblin's preventive strike against the possible anti-Semitic charge that he would align himself with other Jews. Some twenty years earlier, however, when Doblin was beginning his career as both writer and psychiatrist, his sympathy for the insane had its origin in his generation's multilayered interest in the figure of the mentally ill and, one should add, the non-European "uncivilized primitive" that entered the cultural sphere in Germany through the "discovery" of exotic, primitive art as a result of German colonialism.' The image of the insane offered this group of young expressionist writers a welcome opportunity to differentiate itself from a much-despised bourgeois, "healthy" norm and to express its self-understanding as literary avant garde. In numerous poems, stories, and programmatic essays their literary fantasies about madness, the insane, and psychiatric institutions allowed the avant garde not only to present their critique of Wilhelminian society, whose norms and social institutions had become too repressive, but also to voice their cultural anxieties about an increasingly threatening existential alienation.6 Doblin's story "Die Ermordung einer Butterblume" ("The Murder of a Buttercup") (written 1904; published 1910) is an excellent example for the expressionists' instrumentalization of madness. By depicting the paranoid delusions of a young gentleman, whose veneer of bourgeois behavior can barely conceal the eruption of madness, Doblin makes his readers aware of both his protagonist's suppressed irrational impulses and the subconscious causes of his actions. More importantly, Doblin's story, written only several months before his dissertation, makes use of a pathology that he studied quite thoroughly in his work on Korsakoff's syndrome: amnesia.
The man dressed in black had first counted his steps, one, two, three, to a hundred and back, as he climbed the wide path through the firs to St. Ottilien, and with each movement he rocked with his hips to the right and left, so that he sometimes stumbled; then he forgot it. ("Ermordung" 102; emphasis added) While the motive of amnesia is admittedly only a marginal one in Doblin' The beginnings of the experimental study of memory date back to the late nineteenth century. Of course, philosophers throughout the centuries have produced a large body of literature on memory and mnemotechnics, and most of the metaphors with which psychologists have tried to form an image of the invisible processes in our memory are variations of these earlier hypotheses about memory. Plato, for example, gave us the most influential metaphors of memory as "storehouse" and "wax tablet" on which the scholar can draw or write, and these two forms of notation were later taken over into the "library model" that made it possible to distinguish between different types of stacking arrangements for two types of material, the verbal and visuo-spatial. And in the first major work on memory,
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] contributed to the scientific status of psychology by applying "scientific methods" to problems of sensation, perception, and their physiological foundations in the human organism, they still refrained from investigating human memory directly and experimentally. Despite the existence of the first psychological experiments in the 1860s, "the philosophers," according to a historian of experimental psychology, owned psychology; they believed that philosophy and thus psychology must depend upon scientific method, but for all this conviction they could not make themselves into experimentalists. They could, however, be good empiricists; they could use the results of science when the results were available, and they could emphasize experience at the expense of pure reason. Thus the path from philosophy to experimental psychology lay through empirical psychology. The first systematic experimental analysis of human memory is found in Hermann Ebbinghaus's (1850 Ebbinghaus's ( -1909 epoch-making study Ober das Gedachtnis (Memory, 1885), which shaped the subsequent course of the new research on memory. Ebbinghaus began his experiments on memory in 1879 after he had allegedly browsed through Fechner's treatise on psychophysics in the late 1870s and recognized that he was interested in a territory that had not previously been subject to the same kind of scientific rigor as other phenomena in the natural sciences. Conscious of his efforts to widen the scope of experimental research to psychological areas such as memory that were thought to be "too complex," he admonished his readers "who are not already convinced a priori of the impossibility of such an attempt to postpone their decision about its practicality" (qtd. in Postman 150). Using himself as his subject for several years while he was a Dozent at the University of Berlin, where he set up one of the first research laboratories, Ebbinghaus tried to answer some of the basic questions concerning human memory by measuring numerically the mental processes that define our mnemonic abilities. How much information can we store? How fast can we acquire it? And how long can we keep it? In order to obtain quantifiable data which in the future could be compared to similar data gained from different persons, Ebbinghaus would invent a string of nonsense syllables (two consonants with a vowel in between), learn it, note the time required for the task, relearn it at some later time, again note the time, and determine the amount of saved time, which would allow him to make some observations about the way his memory functioned (hoping, of course, that some general "laws" governing human memory could eventually be established). His famous "forgetting curve," for example, showed that we forget very rapidly immediately after an event and then more slowly as time passes. He also found that "savings" steadily increased with large numbers of repetitions, that fatigue affected memory, in short, that there are quantifiable relations between the number of repetitions, the length of the word lists, and the time elapsed between the tests. Some of these results may strike us today as trivial. And Ebbinghaus's concern for scientific "objectivity," his effort to cleanse the recollected verbal material of all "subjective" dimensions (hence his use of nonsensical syllables) limited his understanding of memory. Memory for him was just a storage bin for objective items that could either be retrieved or not. But his experiments had an immediate and far-reaching (international) impact on the study of memory and memory disorders in the years surrounding the publication of Doblin's dissertation on Korsakoff s syndrome. Indeed, the new field of experimental psychology of memory developed into such a booming and successful enterprise between 1885, the date of publication of Ebbinghaus's Memory, and the first decade of the twentieth century that psychologists were beginning to look back on their short history and review their increased knowledge about memory and proper ways to test it. The American psychologist Robert 6 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] interest revolves around the psycho-physical problem of how something immaterial like perceptions can be transformed into material "traces," physically stored, and recalled at some later time. After rejecting earlier nineteenth-century models of memory as "physics of the soul" (Gedachtnisstorungen 13) because they erroneously conceived of memory as a kind of mechanical storage bin where all our experiences supposedly co-exist next to each other, as well as physiological theories of the "trace" that locate memory traces in the brain without telling us how some of our past experiences reenter our present mental life and others do not, Dublin summarizes his review of the existing literature with a slightly melancholic tone:
"We can only deduce that something physical remains which later explains our recollection" (16) . And since the relationship between the physical and psychological aspects of memory presents itself as an "astonishing secret" (14), Dublin limits his further speculations to an investigation of the psychological processes that structure recollection. As (17) Dublin's rejection of the principle of causality and the notion of the dissociated nature of our psychological life soon became the cornerstones of his theory for a new novelistic form. In his programmatic essay from 1913 "An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker"12 ("To Novelists and Their Critics"), Dublin offered his own version of the expressionists' critique of rationality and psychologism that were associated with a reified nineteenth-century bourgeois culture. Playing out psychiatry against psychology as the better model of scientific investigation the modern writer should turn to, Dublin repudiates psychology in the novel as a "purely abstract phantasmagoria" because "analyses and attempts to differentiate have nothing to do with the issue of a real psyche." Psychology has become "the most pampered rationalism" and "rationalism has always been the death of art" (120). Instead of musing on the possible motives for his protagonist's actions, the prose writer should, for example, avoid empty linguistic signs such as "rage," "love," or "contempt" andin the name of a more authentic realism-focus on their exterior appearance, "changes of behavior and effects" (121). A few years later, in an essay entitled "Reform des Romans," Dublin repeated in a typically expressionist fashion his claim that both modern art and literature aim at the destruction of rational structures: Giants (1924) , and his masterpiece Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), Dublin carried out these experiments and introduced the narrative technique of parataxis, the discontinuous arrangement of word and sentence without the syntactic depth of subordination, to the modern German novel.
After these comments on the discontinuous nature of psychological processes in general, Dublin proceeds to an investigation of the failures of memory in Korsakoff's patients. For a long time psychologists have tried to explain why our memory sometimes fails and have generated a full range of answers: some have argued that memory may fail because the perception or idea never got into the store in the first place; others have claimed that it did get in but disappeared, either through decay or by some other object or stimulus that replaced it; or it got in and is still there but for some reason we can no longer find it or get access to it. Dublin's solution to this Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] Marshall and Fryer 13) . Agreeing with the nineteenth-century psychologist Wundt that our recollections are always already a combination of the impressions we form through perception and pre-existing recollections already stored in our memory, Doblin rejects the notion that forgetting is a failure of the storing process ("Haftstorung") and views it as a problem concerning the combination of new perceptions with previously stored memory material ("Verbindungsstorung"). Absolute forgetting is thus not possible, or at least we cannot prove it. For Doblin, all amnestic disorders are the result of an impediment that blocks access to previous recollections that we use in order to make sense of new impressions. Of course, there are different degrees of stability among these associations, depending on how firmly they are tied to each other. A typical Korsakoff's patient does not usually suffer from an inability to recognize objects ("Auffassungsstorung"), because his capacity to associate objects with their linguistic signs is still intact. Countless repetitions have produced such a strong connection between object and sign that only the most severe memory disturbance can break it apart. The fact that it is primarily the short-term memory that fails the Korsakoff's patient points to his enormous difficulty in associating new information with recollections already stored ("Merkfahigkeitsstorung"). Due to excessive consumption of alcohol, the glue between them has somehow lost its adhesiveness. In severe cases of Korsakoff's syndrome the connection between recollections and new perceptions may be severed to the point of complete dissociation:
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The present impediment in someone's ability to form representations [Vorstellungshemmung] For Deblin, the memory disorder in Korsakoff's syndrome is a result of the dissociation of the recollections in our memory. In other words, there is a plethora of free-floating images whose "historical" contexts the patient has lost. Mnemonic fragments of completely different origins lose their temporal sequence that enables a normally functioning memory to bind them together and begin to form new relations over which Korsakoff's patient has no rational control.
Without blurring the difference between the mental "products" of patients suffering from amnestic disorders and the rational construction of works of art, I would like to suggest here a distant affinity between Doblin's description of the dissociation of recollections in a Korsakoff's patient and some formal characteristics of modern literature. The inability of the patient to distinguish between reality fragments, dreams, previously read texts, and hallucinations, and correctly determine their original contexts bears some structural resemblance to the widespread use of the form of montage as expression of modern life, particularly the experience of a new sense of time. From the Dadaist text montages to the penchant of the expressionist writers for the so-called "serial style" to the automatic texts of the Surrealists to the high-modernist novels of Proust, Joyce, and Doblin, the montage was used to represent the simultaneity of perception by breaking up temporal sequence. The depiction of a continuously and teleologically evolving time, as we know it from nineteenth-century Realism, was gradually replaced by what Joseph Frank in his classic essay has termed "the spatial form" in modern literature. Both modern art and literature have, each in its own way, attempted to overcome the time elements involved in their structures. According to Frank, modern poetry and prose desire to "un-dermine the inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the elements of the poem [or novel] as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time" (Spatial Form 12) . Moreover, in a literary montage, the various parts emancipate themselves from a superordinate whole and sometimes lack necessity. For example, in many expressionist poems that string images together in a "serial style," some could be missing or added, yet the meaning of the text would not be fundamentally affected. The different parts of a montage are therefore not linked by significant temporal or causal relationships. Alfred Lichtenstein's poem "Morning" (1913), illustrating the expressionist writers' fascination with madness and physical decay, serves as a representative example for their highly dissociated perception of reality that is presented to us as a chain of unconnected images:
And all the streets lie snug there, clean and regular. Only at times some brawny fellow hurries by. A very smart young girl fights fiercely with Papa.
for a change, looks at the lovely sky. The dead sun hangs on houses, broad as it is sick. Four bulging women shrilly squeak outside a bar.
The driver of a cab falls down and breaks his neck. And all is boringly bright, salubrious and clear.
A wise-eyed gentleman floats madly, full of night, An ailing god . . . within this scene, which he forgot Or failed to notice-Mutters something. Dies. And laughs. Dreams of a cerebral stroke, paralysis, bone-rot.
(Reprinted in Hamburger 131)
I am suggesting here that we understand the dissociation of the perception of reality in modern literature and the dissociation of memory material in a Korsakoff's patient as parallel and structurally similar "discoveries." Obviously, there are fundamental differences between a writer's conscious effort to represent what he experiences as the disintegration of his cultural environment and the Korsakoff's patient's futile search for the correct recollections in his shattered memory. But the idea of dissociation provided Doblin, who during the first decade of the twentieth century was equally familiar with psychiatric and literary discourses, with an excellent conceptual tool to write about a particular memory disorder and some formal aspects of modern literature.
It comes as no surprise, then, that Doblin devotes the last part of his dissertation to a discussion of a symptom that allows him to draw a direct line between his psychiatric interest and the creative act of writing. Particularly in the early days of the disease, most Korsakoff's patients tend to answer their doctor's questions with "confabulations" that seem to have no basis in the patient's life. According to Doblin, these confabulations are caused by the patient's weak memory and involve that part of his life for which only dissociated recollections exist:
The dislocated recollections and the obvious phantasms have a common root: in the final analysis, the stories about robbers and the encounters with wild animals must also be explained by an impediment of the formation of associations [Verbindungsstorung] ; no further recollection of their origin, such as "I read it in this or that book," "in my dreams," "I hallucinated," is tied to these recollections, from wherever they may originate. These phantasms are thus also the products of dissociation, they are caused by the chaotic memory; for the patient lacks any means to somehow correct a new representation on the basis of fixed recollections. (GecliichtnisstOrungen 33) When asked to answer questions about recent events that Korsakoff's patient could not store properly in his memory, he finds a number of heterogeneous "texts" in his "library" and constructs "stories" from them, often systematically and with great skill. To further explain the characteristics of the patient's confabulations, Doblin compares them with "poetic fabulations": "In both cases we are dealing with an impediment of the formations of associations [Verbindungsstorungen] : what was experienced as real gets dislocated; that which has been dreamt, read, thought, and hallucinated about gets mixed up with [and] exchanged" (35) . Like the Korsakoff s patient, the writer, too, "frees" his linguistic material from its original context, dissolves any temporal and causal relations that might have existed between its various elements, and reassembles them into a new "text." By pointing out, however, some major differences between the Korsakoff's patient and the writer and their respective products, Doblin avoids the danger of seeing the writer as an "ill" person and thereby contributing to the widespread discourse throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that drew
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol22/iss1/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1436 numerous analogies between creative individuals and the ill, above all the insane.15 The first difference concerns the moment of "production"; whereas the writer supposedly creates his works in a state of excitement, the patient puts forth his confabulations "in complete calmness" and in a "somber voice" (35) . The second difference pertains to the "realism" of their "stories." Unlike the Korsakoff's patient who suffers from the illusion that his "stories" are the products of real experience, the writer remains aware of the fictional character of his texts. And the third and most important distinction touches upon their different ways of combining the dissociated elements that constitute the products of their imagination. Whereas the writer is able to organize his heterogenous recollections by means of a guiding idea ["Zielvorstellung"] that lends even the most fragmented literary texts aesthetic coherence, the person afflicted with memory loss completely lacks such unifying principles. Doblin's discussion of the creative act of writing was inspired by his reading of one of the first books that specifically deals with the psychology of creative imagination. In his Essai sur l'imagination creatrice (Essay on the Creative Imagination, 1900), Theodule Ribot, who earlier in his career had contributed the concept of retrograde amnesia to the study of memory loss, explored the constitutive factors of constructive imagination, its historical development "from the dimmest to the most complex forms," and "the principal types of imagination" (ix) . In a passage pointing out the similarities between "mechanical imagination" and "aesthetic imagination," Whereas traditional and genuine memory (Gedachtnis) enables the individual to "form an image of himself' (160), i.e., to assimilate his life experience in such a way that a meaningful and coherent lifestory may result, modem societies produce a different kind of memory (Erinnerung) that deprives us of any way of assimilating our sensations and perceptions and transforming them into a lasting personal experience. Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu was written at a time when this gradual loss of a genuinely assimilated experience had already begun to make literary projects such as Proust's more and more difficult. His narrator's desire to construct a story of his childhood in order to gain knowledge about himself could only be realized with enormous difficulties and, moreover, the entire project was subject to mere chance. Although Benjamin does not speak of the Bildungsroman in this context, one could argue that he relegates teleological storytelling to an irretrievable past. The subjective past of one's childhood for Proust is "somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect, and unmistakably in some material object (or in the sensation which such an object arouses in us), though we have no idea which one it is. As for that object, it depends entirely on chance whether we come upon it before we die or whether we never encounter it" (160). Proust's famous term for the agency that can provide us with access to the unconscious material buried within ourselves, memoire involontaire, is of course based on his reading of Henri Bergson's Matiere et memoire (1896), another influential work on memory written at the end of the nineteenth century, where Bergson approaches the problem of human memory from a biological perspective. Despite giving Bergson much credit for his early work on memory, Benjamin levels his criticism against Bergson's ahistorical approach. What Bergson failed to do is to examine the historical and social situation "from which his own philosophy evolved, or, rather, in reaction to which it arose" (159), i.e., to investigate those historical changes that brought about the loss of experience. Benjamin's chief witness for this loss and the emergence of a different kind of registering and absorbing stimuli is Baudelaire's Fleurs du mal (1857). According to Benjamin, Baudelaire's poetry should be read as an historical document showing how modern society, on account of the increasing number of shocks to which the organism is now subjected, strengthened human consciousness as a mental defense mechanism against these shocks, protecting us perhaps against an increasing bombardment of shock-like stimuli from our environment, yet simultaneously preventing us from absorbing these sensations, assimilating them to our previous life-experience, and making them part of our own. Benjamin uses Freud's distinction between unconscious memory and the conscious act of recollection (similar to Proust's distinction between memoire involontaire and memoire
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] , Art. 7 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol22/iss1/7 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1436 volontaire) in order to show why a modern culture, despite and on account of an increase in shocks and other stimuli, leaves so few traces behind and makes it so difficult for modern subjects to construct a coherent image of themselves. For Freud, "becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory trace are processes incompatible with each other within one and the same system" (162). And the more efficient our consciousness functions as a screen against stimuli, the less these impressions enter experience and tend to remain on the "surface" of one's consciousness, waiting to be quickly forgotten or, perhaps even more importantly, entering our memory, but only in a highly dissociated form. Benjamin thought of the vast amount of unassimilated information people were exposed to while reading a newspaper (today the plethora of television images or computer images might serve as better examples); of the multitude of new, unconnected stimuli a nineteenth-century city dweller was confronted with; but also of new technological inventions like the conveyer belt that replaced an older and slower form of manufactur-
